Intellexa’s Global Corporate Web

The author, Julian-Ferdinand Vögele, thanks Amnesty International’s Security Lab for its ongoing reporting on the Intellexa and Predator spyware ecosystem. Today, Security Lab published a related report on Intellexa, which can be found here. Executive Summary Insikt Group identified several individuals and entities linked to Intellexa and its broader network of associated companies. These connections span technical, operational, and corporate roles, including backend development, infrastructure setup, and company formation. Using export and import data, Insikt Group identified one entity linked to the previously reported Czech cluster that facilitated the shipment of Intellexa products to clients. In at least one instance, a direct delivery was made to an end user, while additional entities in Kazakhstan and the Philippines appear to have been involved in product imports, indicating an expanding network footprint. Two additional entities in the advertising sector may be tied to the “Aladdin” ad-based infection vector, previously associated with the Czech cluster via a leaked 2022 invoice. In addition, Recorded Future’s proprietary intelligence revealed ongoing Predator spyware activity in multiple countries, including new evidence of its deployment in Iraq. The continued domestic use of mercenary spyware such as Predator poses significant privacy, legal, and physical security risks worldwide. Although civil society remains the primary target in most publicly documented cases, recent evidence shows that executives and other high-profile individuals with substantial intelligence value are increasingly being targeted as well. Due to Predator’s costly licensing model, operators are likely to reserve its deployment for high-value strategic targets, placing politicians, business leaders, and individuals in sensitive roles at heightened risk. Meanwhile, the widespread and likely unlawful use of spyware against political opposition continues to be a pressing issue under investigation in several European Union (EU) member states, including Poland and Greece. Insikt Group assesses that several key trends are shaping the spyware ecosystem, including growing balkanization as companies split along geopolitical lines, with some sanctioned entities seeking renewed legitimacy through acquisitions while others shift toward regions with weaker oversight (1, 2). Despite this, a core network of facilitators continues to underpin the industry’s operations. Furthermore, rising competition and secrecy surrounding high-value exploit technologies are heightening risks of corruption, insider leaks, and attacks on spyware vendors themselves. Targeting has also expanded beyond traditional civil society figures to include corporate leaders and private-sector individuals (1, 2), suggesting that the publicly visible cases represent only a fraction of a much larger, concealed global ecosystem. Key Findings * Insikt Group uncovered additional companies highly likely tied to Intellexa’s broader corporate web, particularly within the previously discussed Czech cluster. At least one of these entities appears to have been used to ship Intellexa products to clients, offering further insight into Intellexa’s global business structures. * Two newly identified companies appear to operate in the advertising sector and may be connected to a previously reported ad-based infection vector known as “Aladdin.” This vector was earlier associated with the Czech cluster through a leaked invoice from 2022 showing payments for a proof-of-concept to an individual linked to that cluster. * Analysis of export and import databases revealed indications that one of the newly identified companies was used to deliver Intellexa products to end customers, either directly or through intermediaries. This research also exposed two additional entities located in Kazakhstan and the Philippines.
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